Editorial
Since the Iranian year 1400 (March 21, 2021), a new social force has emerged in Iran: the “poor middle class.” This paradoxical group—first conceptualized by Asef Bayat in his study of the Arab uprisings—consists of urban, educated youth who grew up in middle-class households but now struggle with unemployment, low wages, and economic precarity. They possess the aspirations and worldview of the middle class but live under the constraints of poverty, bridging previously distinct social strata.
Data indicate that the Iranian middle class has been shrinking steadily. A recent report in Donya-e-Eqtesad shows that average household consumption at constant prices fell by roughly 10% between 1390 and 1403 (March 2011–March 2025), with the decline disproportionately affecting lower and middle-income groups.
Senior economist Masoud Nili noted in his editorial in February 2025 that per capita net income had dropped 20% since 1390 (2011), while the population below the poverty line reached approximately 32 million.
Studies by Drs. Farzanegan and Habibi also suggest that the middle class shrank by about 28 percentage points between 1390 and 1399 (March 2011–March 2020), reducing the proportion of middle-class individuals from two-thirds of the population to roughly one-third.
The middle class is crucial because it drives social, cultural, and political dynamism. Unlike lower-income groups, middle-class individuals are less constrained by daily survival and can focus on broader civic and cultural issues.
Unlike the wealthy, they are deeply invested in the future of their families and communities. Historically, this class has higher education levels, greater civic participation, broader cultural consumption, and stronger organizational capacity, giving it an outsized influence in shaping public discourse and social development.
For at least three decades, the relationship between the state and the middle class has been tense. Between 1376 and 1396 (March 1997–March 2017), middle-class Iranians sought reformist and development-oriented goals through peaceful protest, media, civil campaigns, and electoral participation. Despite these efforts, their demands were largely ignored or dismissed.
The protests of 1401 (March 2022–March 2023) highlighted the role of the poor middle class as a bridge between middle and lower-income groups.
Movements that began with middle-class concerns, such as women’s freedom of choice in clothing, quickly drew participation from economically marginalized populations, increasing the scale and intensity of demonstrations.
These protests combined the organizational and digital strengths of the middle class with the urgency of lower-income groups, producing a movement that achieved some limited gains but faced severe repression.
Iranian society has shifted: it can no longer be viewed simply as middle class versus lower class, with neatly separated cultural and economic grievances.
A significant portion of the population now experiences both economic hardship and cultural marginalization. Policymakers relying solely on increased oil revenues, cash subsidies, or commodity vouchers to manage unrest are misreading the new social reality.
The poor middle class in Iran now functions as both a bridge and a catalyst, demanding structural reforms that address economic, social, and cultural grievances simultaneously. Ignoring this group risks further unrest and missed opportunities for sustainable development.
